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P2P File-Sharing Systems
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Abstract
We study the interaction between network effects and external incentives on file sharing behavior in
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks. Many current or envisioned P2P networks reward individuals for sharing
files, via financial incentives or social recognition. Peers weigh this reward against the cost of sharing
incurred when others download the shared file. As a result, if other nearby nodes share files as well, the
cost to an individual node decreases. Such positive network sharing effects can be expected to increase
the rate of peers who share files.
In this paper, we formulate a natural model for the network effects of sharing behavior, which we term
the “demand model.” We prove that the model has desirable diminishing returns properties, meaning
that the network benefit of increasing payments decreases when the payments are already high. This
result holds quite generally, for submodular objective functions on the part of the network operator.
In fact, we show a stronger result: the demand model leads to a “coverage process,” meaning that
there is a distribution over graphs such that reachability under this distribution exactly captures the
joint distribution of nodes which end up sharing. The existence of such distributions has advantages in
simulating and estimating the performance of the system. We establish this result via a general theorem
characterizing which types of models lead to coverage processes, and also show that all coverage processes
possess the desirable submodular properties. We complement our theoretical results with experiments
on several real-world P2P topologies. We compare our model quantitatively against more na¨ıve models
ignoring network effects. A main outcome of the experiments is that a good incentive scheme should
make the reward dependent on a node’s degree in the network.
1 Introduction
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file sharing systems have become an important platform for the dissemination of files,
music, and other content. The basic idea is very simple: individuals make files available for download from
their own machine. Other users can search for files they desire and download them from a peer who has
made the file available. Naturally, designing systems such that the search and download of files are efficient
poses many research challenges, which have received a lot of attention in the literature [2, 22].
A second, and somewhat orthogonal, issue is how to ensure sufficient participation and sharing of files.
Unless enough content is provided by individuals, the utility of membership will be very small. If free-
riding [9] is too prevalent, the system may exhibit a quick decrease in membership common to public-goods
type economic settings [23].
Thus, the P2P system must be designed with incentives in mind to encourage file sharing. These incen-
tives can take the form of monetary payments or redeemable “points” [11], download privileges, or simply
recognition. From the system designer’s perspective, these payments should be “small,” while ensuring
enough participation.
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On the other hand, from a peer’s perspective, the payments need to be weighed against the cost incurred
by sharing a file. In this paper, we assume that the content is shared legally and the system is designed
with security in mind: hence, the main cost to an individual is the upload bandwidth which will be used
whenever another peer downloads a file from this node.
Nodes will in general choose to download from nearby peers (in terms of bandwidth or latency). Therefore,
as additional nearby peers share the same files, the load will get distributed among more nodes, and the cost
to each individual node will decrease. Thus, not only will we expect cascading effects of sharing based on
social dynamics [12], but we would also expect these cascading effects to be based on a network structure
determined by point-to-point latencies and bandwidths.
Our contribution in this paper is the definition and analysis (both theoretical and experimental) of a
natural model for peers’ sharing behavior in P2P systems, in the presence of network effects and economic
incentives. In our model, we focus only on sharing one file; in practice, the model can be applied separately
for each file of interest. The basic premise of the model is that each node has a certain demand for the file.
Furthermore, the network determines which percentage of the demand will be met by downloading from each
peer sharing the file1. The crucial implication of this model is that the more nearby peers are sharing a file,
the more evenly the demand will be distributed among them.
The upload bandwidth cost is compensated by a payment to the peers who make the file available.
Again, our model is agnostic about whether these payments are monetary, recognition, or take other forms.
In our model, the payments can be explicitly based on the network degree of peers, since high-degree nodes
presumably serve a key role in propagating sharing behavior.
We argue that this model captures the essential dynamics of P2P systems in which a peer can join the
network and download files without sharing; hence, availability of files is not the only incentive for sharing.
The FastTrack P2P protocol, used by KaZaA, Grokster, and iMesh, is an example where this assumption
holds; hence, our model should be a reasonable approximation for these services in terms of its incentives.
The network operator is interested in maximizing a social welfare functionW , which grows monotonically
as a function of the set of nodes that share the file. This function could be the total number of sharing
nodes, the number of nodes with at least one uploading neighbor, or the total download bandwidth available
to peers under various natural models of downloading.
After defining this model formally (in Section 2), we prove strong and general diminishing returns prop-
erties about it (in Section 3). In particular, we show that whenever W is monotone and submodular, the
network’s social welfare as a function of the payments offered to the peers is monotone i.e., increasing pay-
ments will always increase social welfare. However the rate of increase decreases when payments are already
high. We call the latter property diminishing returns.
To prove this result, we consider a slightly different model, wherein payments are combined with giving
the network operator the ability to “force” some set S of peers to share. By first proving certain local
submodularity properties for this modified model, the desired diminishing returns properties are implied by
the general result of Mossel and Roch [18]. However, we derive a similar result to [18] for a broad subclass of
submodular functions which we call coverage functions. It consists of the functions for which in the underlying
process, the distribution of nodes sharing the file is equivalent to the distribution of nodes reachable from
S in an appropriately defined random graph model. We establish this equivalence via a general and non-
trivial theorem characterizing all functions that can be obtained by counting reachable nodes under random
graph models. As a corollary, our approach provides a much simpler proof of the main result from [18] for
coverage processes. Moreover, the fact that the propagation of sharing behavior is a coverage process is
useful for the purpose of simulating the process and estimating the parameters of the system, allowing more
efficient algorithms for simulations. Finally, our characterization can be of independent interest in the study
of submodular set functions.
While the bulk of our paper focuses on a theoretical analysis of the demand model, we complement the
theoretical results by an experimental evaluation of our model (in Section 4), using two network topologies
derived from real-world data sets [13, 20, 21], and a regular two-dimensional grid topology. We first show
1In practice, we could expect these percentages to correlate strongly with network latency or available bandwidth, but our
model is agnostic about the derivation.
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that network effects are significant by comparing our demand model with one in which peers are not aware
of changes in load due to nearby sharing peers. We then evaluate different payment schemes, in particular
regarding their dependence on nodes’ degrees. We evaluate these both in terms of the fraction of peers that
end up sharing, and the amount paid by the network operator per sharing node.
1.1 Related Work
There is a large body of work on incentive mechanisms in P2P file-sharing systems. (See [8] for a thorough
overview and [27] for a recent generalized analysis framework.) Incentive mechanisms can be classified in
three categories: barter-based mechanisms, reputation-based mechanisms, and currency-based mechanisms.
Barter-based methods [1] enforce repeated transactions among peers by matching each peer to only a
small subset of the network, hence raising the survival chance for strategies based on reciprocation. This
method only works when we have a small and popular set of files. For instance, the BitTorrent protocol [6]
is a popular P2P file-sharing protocol using this method.
Reputation-based mechanisms have an excellent track record at facilitating cooperation in very diverse
settings, from evolutionary biology to marketplaces like eBay. These systems keep a tally of the contribution
of each peer; the past contributions determine which peers obtain more of the system’s resources in the future.
However, the availability of cheap pseudonyms in P2P systems makes reputation systems vulnerable to Sybil
and whitewashing attacks [9], leading to ongoing work on designing sybilproof reputation mechanisms [5].
Moreover, reputation systems may be vulnerable to coordinated gaming strategies due to distributed rating
systems [24].
Inspired by markets, a P2P system can also deploy a currency scheme to facilitate resource contributions
by rational peers. Generally, peers earn currency by contributing resources to the system, and spend the
currency to obtain resources from the system. Karma [25] is one example of this kind. Currency-based
systems may also suffer from Sybil and whitewashing attacks, depending on their policies toward newcomers.
If newcomers are endowed with a positive balance, then the system is vulnerable to these attacks; otherwise,
there might not be enough incentive for newcomers to join the network. Balance control could also be
troublesome, as the system might need to deal with negative balances.
Lai et al. [16] introduced the concept of “private” history vs. “shared” history as a way to combine barter-
based and reputation-based mechanisms in the context of an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma. Shared history
is a pool that records peers’ past behavior and services them according to their reputation. In [9], file sharing
is modeled as a social phenomenon, akin to those discussed by Schelling [23]. Users consider whether or
not to contribute files based on the number of other users who contribute. Our model is different in that it
explicitly models the costs incurred by contributing nodes, rather than simply positing an intrinsic generosity
parameter for each user.
2 Models and Preliminaries
We consider a peer-to-peer network with n servers (or nodes or peers), and focus on the behavior of sharing
one particular file. Thus, each peer v may either choose to share the file or to not share it. We also call
sharing peers active, and the other ones inactive. The set of all peers who share is denoted by V +.
2.1 The Demand Model
Each peer has a local demand dv for the file: this demand will originate from individual users on the server v
(who themselves might not possess the file or be in a position to make it available). The demand dv should
be served by downloading the file from other servers u ∈ V +. The quality of the connection between v and u
is captured by a matrix P : the larger pv,u, the larger a fraction of v’s demand will be served by u (assuming
that u shares the file). Specifically, the demand that u ∈ V + will see from v is dv ·
pv,u∑
w∈V + pv,w
. The matrix P
will in practice depend on network latencies or bandwidth, as well as explicit download agreements. It need
not be symmetric. For the purpose of the general model, we are agnostic to the derivation of P ; in Section
3
4, we will derive P from measured network latencies by positing a latency threshold which individuals are
willing to tolerate.
A node u ∈ V + sharing the file will incur a cost of cu per unit of demand that it serves; this cost is the
result of using upload bandwidth, machine processing time, or similar resources. To encourage peers to share
the file despite this cost, the P2P network administrator offers payments πu to the nodes u ∈ V
+. These
payments need not be the same for all nodes, and can be derived from the network structure, e.g., a node’s
degree.
Different nodes may have different (and unknown) tradeoffs between money and upload bandwidth. We
model this fact by assuming that each node u has a tradeoff factor λu, drawn independently and uniformly
at random from [0, 1], which captures how many units of bandwidth one unit of money is worth to the node.
Thus, the sharing utility of an active node u ∈ V + is
U(u) = λuπu − cu
∑
v
dvpv,u∑
w∈V + pv,w
,
while the sharing utility of non-sharing nodes is 0. (A non-sharing node does not get paid and incurs no
upload costs.) We assume that agents are rational, and thus choose whether to share or not to share so as
to maximize their own utility.
2.2 Other Models
As we discussed in Section 1, one of our main contributions is the observation that file sharing behavior
should be subject to positive network externalities, i.e., that the presence of other sharing peers makes
sharing less costly. To quantify the size of such network effects, we define two alternative models with no or
limited effects; we will compare these two models experimentally with the demand model in Section 4.
1. In the No-Network Model, the peers completely ignore other sharing peers. Thus, a node u assumes
that if it shares the file, then it will see a fraction pv,u of the demand originating with node u. Hence,
the perceived utility of node u when sharing is
U(u) = λuπu − cu ·
∑
v
dvpv,u.
2. In the One-Hop Model, the peers are aware of network effects in a very limited way: node u assumes
that any node v sharing the file will contribute toward serving both v’s and u’s demand, but not toward
serving the demand of any other node w 6= u, v. Thus, the perceived utility of node u ∈ V + is in the
One-Hop Model is
U(u) = λuπu − cu ·
dupu,u∑
w∈V + pu,w
− cu ·
∑
v 6=u
dvpv,u∑
w∈V +∩{u,v} pv,w
.
2.3 Payment Schemes, Sharing Process, and Administrator’s Objective
The network administrator’s choice is how to set the payment offers πu. In doing so, the administrator
balances two competing goals: low overall payments and high utility for the participants in the system. In
this paper, we study the impact of payment schemes on these objectives.
In order to provide enough incentives for sharing, the network administrator should always ensure that
πu ≥ Cu := cu ·
∑
v dv. Otherwise, even a node u with λu = 1 (i.e., the highest possible utility for money)
would have no incentive to share the file if no other peers are sharing the file.
The full model is thus as follows: after the administrator decides on the payments πu for all nodes
u, the random tradeoffs λu between money and bandwidth are determined independently for all nodes u.
Subsequently, the process proceeds in iterations. In each iteration, all peers simultaneously decide whether
to share the file or not, based on the payments, costs, and previous decisions of all other peers. The process
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continues until an equilibrium is reached. Notice that because the cost to a peer is monotone decreasing
in the set V + of currently sharing peers, the set of sharing peers can only become larger from iteration to
iteration. In particular, this implies that the process will eventually terminate with some set V + of active
peers. We call this the sharing process or activation process.
The network administrator is in general interested in increasing access to the file while keeping the
payments low. This general objective may be captured using various metrics. In general, we allow for any
overall social welfare function W which increases monotonically in the set S of sharing nodes. Notice that
since the set S itself is the result of a random process, the administrator’s goal will be to maximize E [W (S)],
where S is derived from the random activation process in the demand model. Several social welfare functions
W suggest themselves naturally:
1. The number of active peers is a natural measure of participation. It is the measure frequently studied
in the context of the diffusion of innovations or behaviors in social networks [10,12,14,15,17,18]. While
the objective is similar, the precise dynamics are different between those models and the demand model.
2. The total number of serviced nodes, i.e., nodes v with at least one active node u with pu,v > 0. This
model is appropriate if we only care about how many peers can download the file, but not about
the quality of the connection. It implicitly assumes that each peer has a constant utility of 1 for
downloading.
3. Each node u gets a utility of
∑
v∈V + pu,v, and the social welfare is the sum of all these utilities. This
model is based on the assumption that u’s demand is served by all of its neighbors (including possibly
u) simultaneously, and that u’s utility is the total “download bandwidth” available in this sense. We
call this the sum-welfare function.
4. Each node u gets a utility of maxv∈V + pu,v, and the social welfare is the sum of all these utilities. This
is based on the assumption that u’s demand is served by its active neighbor with the best connection,
corresponding to a situation where parallel download from multiple sources is not possible. We call
this the max-welfare function.
Notice that the social welfare function W may also include the utilities of the sharing nodes.
3 Theoretical Analysis of the Model
The main analytical contribution of this paper is based on coverage processes2, defined formally in Definition
5. Informally, a coverage process is a random process such that the distribution over sets of ultimately active
nodes is also the distribution of reachable nodes under a suitably chosen distribution of random graphs. Our
results on coverage processes are twofold:
(1) We give a general characterization of coverage processes, and show that the activation process for P2P
systems is a coverage process. (2) We give a significantly simplified proof (compared to the general result
of [18]) showing that under coverage processes, the expected social welfare as a function of the payments has
diminishing returns in the sense of Definition 1 so long as the social welfare is a submodular function of the
active nodes.
Recall that a function f defined on sets is submodular if f(S + v) − f(S) ≥ f(T + v) − f(T ) whenever
S ⊆ T , i.e., if the addition of an element to a larger set causes a smaller increase in the function value than
to a smaller set. Thus, submodularity is the discrete analogue of concavity, and intuitively corresponds to
“diminishing returns.” An easy inductive proof (on the size of X) shows that submodularity is equivalent
to the condition that for all sets X ,
f(S ∪X)− f(S) ≥ (T ∪X)− f(T ) whenever S ⊆ T. (1)
2We thank Bobby Kleinberg for this naming suggestion, and also note here that Theorem 8 was derived independently by
him.
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Definition 1 A function g : Rn → R has diminishing returns if for every pair i, j and all vectors x, it
satifises
∂g(x1, x2, . . . , xn)
∂xi∂xj
≤ 0.
Remark 2 The notion of “diminishing returns” is strictly weaker than concavity; it corresponds to concavity
only along positive coordinates axes.3
The two main contributions of our paper together imply the following theorem as a corollary:
Theorem 3 Let W (π1, . . . , πn) = E [W (S)] be the expected social welfare when set S is obtained from the
sharing process of the demand model with payments π1, . . . , πn.
If W (S) is submodular, then W (π1, . . . , πn) is monotone and has diminishing returns with respect to the
payments π1, . . . , πn.
For the social welfare function, the diminishing returns property intuitively means that the additional
benefit in social welfare that can be derived from increasing the payment to a peer u decreases as the peers’
current payments increase.
The proof of Theorem 3 is based on analyzing the following Seed Set Model, which we define mainly for
the purpose of analysis.
Definition 4 (Seed Set Model) For each node, the payment offered is πu = Cu. Besides payments, we
have a seed set S of peers that will always share regardless of the payments. Subsequently, the process unfolds
exactly according to the sharing process.
The main technical step is to show that the Seed Set Model is a coverage process, in the following sense.
Definition 5 (Coverage Process) Let φ(S) be the random variable describing the set of nodes active at
the end of a process starting from the set S of nodes active. The process is called a coverage process if there
exists a distribution D over graphs G such that for each set T of nodes, Prob[φ(S) = T ] equals the probability
that exactly T is reachable starting from S in G if G is drawn from the distribution D.
Remark 6 Without using our nomenclature, [14] showed submodularity for the Cascade and Threshold
models of innovation diffusion [10,12] by establishing that both gave rise to coverage processes. Subsequently,
[15] showed that there are natural diffusion processes which are not coverage processes, yet have a submodular
function E [|φ(S)|].
We prove that the Seed Set Model is a coverage process in two steps. First, in Section 3.1, we give a
general and complete characterization of Coverage Processes. This characterization may be of interest in its
own right, as coverage processes have a practical advantage: they can be simulated easily and efficiently, by
first generating a random graph according to D, and then simply finding the set of reachable nodes.
Then, in Section 3.2, we show that the Seed Set Process satisfies the conditions established in Section
3.1. Finally, in Section 3.3, we give a simple proof that for any coverage process and any submodular social
welfare function, the expected social welfare under the process is also submodular. This implies diminishing
returns with respect to the payments.
Remark 7 The fact that the tradeoffs λu between money and bandwidth are uniformly random in [0, 1] is
important to ensure the submodularity and diminishing returns properties. If the λu are not random but
fixed, then the diminishing returns and submodularity properties cease to hold. Furthermore, in the Seed
Set Model, the optimization problem of finding the best seed set S of at most k nodes becomes very hard,
as we show in the appendix.
3We thank Shaddin Dughmi for pointing out this ambiguity in an earlier version of the paper.
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3.1 Characterization of Coverage Processes
In this section, we characterize exactly which random processes are coverage processes. This theorem may
be of interest in its own right, when analyzing different processes.
Our setting is exactly as in the paper by Mossel and Roch [18]: each node u has an activation function
fu, which is monotone non-decreasing and satisfies fu(∅) = 0. Each node independently chooses a threshold
θu ∈ [0, 1] uniformly at random, and becomes active when fu(S) ≥ θu, where S is the previously active set
of nodes. This process is repeated until no more changes occur.
In order to express our results concisely, we use the following discrete equivalent of a derivative (see,
e.g., [26]). For a function f defined on sets, we define inductively:
f∅(S) = f(S)
fR∪{v}(S) = fR(S ∪ {v})− fR(S).
It is not difficult to verify that this notion is well-defined, i.e., independent of which element v is chosen at
which stage.
Theorem 8 The following conditions are necessary and sufficient for the process to be a coverage process.
• For all sets T of odd cardinality |T |, as well as for T = ∅, and each node u, we have fuT (T ) ≥ 0.
• For all sets T of positive even cardinality |T |, and each node u, we have fuT (T ) ≤ 0.
• fu(∅) = 0 for all u.
To prove this theorem, we begin with the following reasoning. Focus on one node u, and its activation
function fu. If there were an equivalent graph distribution D, then it would have to define a probability
qu(T ) for the presence of edges from exactly the vertex set T to u. These probabilities need to satisfy the
following property: if a set S of nodes is active, then the probability of u having at least one incoming edge
from S must equal fu(S). Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for being a coverage function is that
for each node u, there exists a distribution qu(T ) over sets T such that
fu(S) =
∑
T :T∩S 6=∅
qu(T ). (2)
We can express this requirement more compactly using matrix notation. Let fu be the (2
n−1)-dimensional
vector consisting of all entries of fu(S) for S 6= ∅. Similarly, let qu be the (2n − 1)-dimensional vector of
all qu(S) for S 6= ∅. Let A be the ((2n − 1) × (2n − 1))-dimensional matrix indexed by non-empty subsets
such that AS,T = 1 if and only if S ∩ T 6= ∅, and AS,T = 0 otherwise. (A is called an incidence matrix [4].)
Then, Equation 2 can be rewritten as the requirement that for each node u, there exists a distribution qu
such that A · qu = fu.
For the analysis, we fix a canonical ordering of subsets. Specifically, if the current (sub-)universe consists
of k nodes indexed {1, 2, . . . , k}, their canonical ordering is defined recursively as first containing all subsets
of {1, 2, . . . , k − 1} in canonical order, then the set {k}, followed by the sets T ∪ {k}, where the sets
T ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1} appear in canonical order.
In order to find out when the distribution qu exists, we want to solve the equation A · qu = fu, or
fu = A
−1 ·qu. While the inverses of some incidence matrices have been studied before (see, e.g., [3]), we are
not aware of any source explicitly giving the inverse of the matrix A. Hence, we establish here:
Lemma 9 The inverse of A is the matrix B defined by
bS,T :=
{
0 if S ∪ T 6= {1, . . . , n}
(−1)|S∩T |+1 otherwise
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Proof. The key insight is that under the canonical ordering of sets defined above, the matrices A and B
can be defined recursively via matrices Ak and Bk. Specifically, let A1 = 1, and
Ak+1 =


Ak
0
... Ak
0
0
0 . . . 0 0 1 1 . . . 1 1
Ak
1
... 1
1
1


.
Similarly, let B1 = 1, and
Bk+1 =


0
0
... Bk
0
-1
0 . . . 0 -1 0 0 . . . 0 1
Bk
0
... −Bk
0
1


.
The fact that A = An and B = Bn can be observed directly from the definition and the canonical ordering.
To prove the lemma, we can show by induction on k that Ak · Bk = Ik for all k, where Ik is the k × k
identity matrix. The base case k = 1 is obvious. For the inductive step to k + 1, consider the (i, j) entry
(Ak+1 · Bk+1)i,j . We distinguish 7 different cases, based on the (i, j) indices. (We use 0 to denote the
(2k − 1) · (2k − 1) matrix of all zeroes, 1 for the vector of all ones, and uˆ for the (2k − 1)-dimensional unit
vector with 1 in its last coordinate and 0 everywhere else.)
1. If i, j < 2k, then the entry is (Ak · 0)i,j + 0 + (Ak · Bk)i,j = (Ik)i,j by induction hypothesis.
2. If i > 2k, j < 2k, then (writing i′ = i− 2k), the entry is (Ak · 0)i′,j − uˆi′ + (1 ·Bk)i′ = 0 using Lemma
10(a) below.
3. If i < 2k, j > 2k, then (writing j′ = j − 2k), the entry is (Ak ·Bk)i,j′ + 0i,j′ − (Ak ·Bk)i,j′ = 0.
4. If i, j > 2k, then (writing i′ = i− 2k, j′ = j− 2k), the entry is (Ak ·Bk)i′,j′ + uˆj′ − (1 ·Bk)j′ = (Ik)i′,j′ ,
again using Lemma 10(a).
5. If i = j = 2k, a straightforward calculation shows that the entry is 1.
6. If i = 2k, j < 2k, then the entry is (1 · Bk)j − uˆj = 0 by Lemma 10(a). Similarly, for i = 2k, j > 2k,
writing j′ = j − 2k, the entry is uˆj′ − (1 · Bk)j′ = 0 by Lemma 10(a).
7. Finally, for j = 2k, i < 2k, the entry is −(Ak · uˆT )i+(Ak · uˆT )i = 0, whereas for j = 2k, i > 2k, writing
i′ = i− 2k, the entry is −(Ak · uˆT )i′ + 1 = 0 by Lemma 10(b).
This proves that Ak+1 · Bk+1 = Ik+1.
Lemma 10 Let 1 be the vector of all 1’s, and uˆ defined as in the proof of Lemma 9. Then, (a) 1 ·Bk = uˆ,
and (b) Ak · uˆT = 1.
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Proof. For part (a), we show that the row sums of all rows of Bk are zero except the last row, which has
a row sum of one. The proof is by induction. The base case B1 = 1 is clear. For the inductive step from k
to k+1, first notice that all the entries in columns j < 2k − 1 are zero by induction hypothesis. For column
2k − 1, the row sum of Bk contributes 1 by induction hypothesis, from which 1 is subtracted because of the
entry in the middle column. Column 2k adds up to 0 explicitly, and columns j = 2k + 1, . . . , 2k+1 − 2 have
terms of Bk and −Bk canceling out. Finally, for the last column, the entries of Bk and −Bk cancel out,
leaving the entry 1 from the middle column.
For part (b), simply notice that using part (a) and the induction hypothesis of Lemma 9 (for k), we get
that Ak · uˆT = Ak ·BTk · 1 = Ik · 1 = 1. Here, we used that Bk is symmetric.
The next lemma shows that so long as all qu(S) are non-negative, by setting qu(∅) appropriately, we can
always obtain a probability distribution.
Lemma 11 With qu(S) defined as qu = B · fu, we have
∑
S qu(S) ≤ 1.
Proof. Let 1 denote the all-ones vector as before. We can rewrite∑
S
qu(S) = 1 · (B · fu) = (1 · B) · fu.
Using Lemma 10(a), the sum is exactly equal to fu({1, . . . , n}) ≤ 1, completing the proof.
By Lemma 9, we know that qu = B · fu. And by Lemma 11, the entries sum up to at most 1. Thus, it
remains to show that the entries of qu are non-negative if and only if f
u satisfies the conditions of Theorem
8. To relate these formulations, we prove the following non-recursive characterization of discrete derivatives.
Lemma 12 For all sets T , we have that
fT (W ) =
∑
S⊆T
(−1)|T |−|S|f(W ∪ S).
Proof. The proof is by induction on |T |. For T = ∅, the claim is trivial. Now, consider a set Tk+1 = Tk∪{t}
of size k + 1. By definition of the discrete derivative and induction hypothesis,
fTk+1(W ) = fTk(W ∪ {t})− fTk(W )
=
∑
S⊆Tk
(−1)k−|S|f(W ∪ S ∪ {t})−
∑
S⊆Tk
(−1)k−|S|f(W ∪ S)
=
∑
S⊆Tk+1:t∈S
(−1)k+1−|S|f(W ∪ S) +
∑
S⊆Tk+1:t/∈S
(−1)k+1−|S|f(W ∪ S)
=
∑
S⊆Tk+1
(−1)k+1−|S|f(W ∪ S),
which completes the inductive proof.
Proof of Theorem 8. Fix any node u, and define qu = B · fu. By Lemma 12, we can write the discrete
derivative of fu at T as
fuT (T ) =
∑
S⊆T
(−1)|T |−|S|fu(T ∪ S).
Now, if |T | is odd, then (−1)|T |−|S| = (−1)|S|+1, so we can rewrite the above as
∑
S⊆T
(−1)|S|+1fu(T ∪ S) =
∑
W⊇T
(−1)|W∩T |+1fu(W ) = qu(T ).
9
Similarly, if |T | is even, then (−1)|T |−|S| = (−1)|S|, so we can rewrite the discrete derivative as
∑
S⊆T
(−1)|S|fu(T ∪ S) =
∑
W⊇T
(−1)|W∩T |fu(W ) = −qu(T ).
Thus, the qu(T ) are all non-negative (and the probability distribution thus well-defined) if and only if
fuT (T ) ≥ 0 for |T | odd, and f
u
T (T ) ≤ 0 for |T | > 0 even.
3.2 Coverage Property of the Seed Set Process
In this section, we establish the following theorem.
Theorem 13 The Seed Set Process is a coverage process.
Proof. In order to prove this theorem, we want to apply Theorem 8. To do so, we need to show that the
local decisions of nodes about sharing can be cast in terms of submodular threshold functions. Specifically,
we define
fu(S) := 1−
1
Cu
· cu ·
∑
v
dvpv,u∑
w∈S∪{u} pv,w
and let θu = 1−
λuπu
Cu
. (Recall from Section 2.3 that Cu = cu ·
∑
v dv.)
A node u becomes active if doing so has positive utility, i.e., if λuπu > cu ·
∑
v
dvpv,u∑
w∈S∪{u} pv,w
. Dividing
both sides by Cu, and subtracting from 1 shows that this is equivalent to saying that
1−
λuπu
Cu
< 1−
1
Cu
· cu ·
∑
v
dvpv,u∑
w∈S∪{u} pv,w
.
Since λuπu is uniformly random in [0, Cu] by the definition of πu in the Seed Set Model, this condition is
equivalent to saying that θu < f
u(S). Thus, we have shown that the activation process can be equivalently
recast in terms of threshold activations functions.
Finally, we need to show that for every node u, all derivatives fuT (S) are non-negative when |T | is odd
and non-positive when |T | > 0 is even. (The fact that fu(S) = fu∅ (S) is non-negative follows directly by
definition.) Let
fˆu(x1, . . . , xn) = 1−
1
Cu
· cu ·
∑
v
dvpv,u∑
vi∈V
pv,vixi
be the continuous equivalent of the local influence function fu. For a set S, let y(S) denote the n-dimensional
vector with y
(S)
i = 1 if vi ∈ S ∪ {u} and y
(S)
i = 0 otherwise. Then, f
u(S) = fˆu(y(S)). Notice that by
definition, there is no division by zero.
Writing dYT = dyi1dyi2 · · ·dyi|T | , where T = {i1, i2, . . . , i|T |}, an easy inductive proof first shows that
fuT (S) =
∫ 1
0
. . .|T |
∫ 1
0
dfˆu(y(S))
dYT
dYT .
It remains to show that each term inside the integration is non-negative for odd |T | and non-positive for
even |T |. We accomplish this by showing that
dfˆu(y(S))
dYT
= (−1)|T |+1|T |!
cu
Cu
∑
v
dvpv,u
∏
t∈T pv,t
(
∑
vi∈V
pv,viy
(S)
i )
|T |+1
.
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The proof is by induction. The base case: |T | = 1 can be verified easily. Assume that the claim holds
for |T | = i− 1. We have
dfˆu(y(S))
dYTdyi
=
d
dyi
(−1)|T |+1|T |!
cu
Cu
∑
v
dvpv,u
∏
t∈T pv,t
(
∑
vi∈V
pv,viyi)
|T |+1
= (−1)(−1)|T |+1|T |!
cu
Cu
·
∑
v
(|T |+ 1)pv,vidvpv,u
∏
t∈T pv,t(
∑
vi∈V
pv,viyi)
|T |
(
∑
vi∈V
pv,viyi)
2|T |+2
= (−1)|T |+2|T + 1|!
cu
Cu
∑
v
dvpv,u
∏
t∈T∪{vi}
pv,t
(
∑
vi∈V
pv,viyi)
|T |+2
.
This completes the inductive proof, and thus the proof of Theorem 13.
While we defined the Seed Set Process primarily as a tool for analysis, we remark here that Theorem 13
has a direct consequence for the optimization problem of maximizing the expected total number of active
nodes at the end of the process, subject to a size constraint on the seed set S. A Theorem of Nemhauser et
al. [7, 19] states that if f is any non-negative, monotone, and submodular function on sets, then the greedy
algorithm is a polynomial-time (1−1/e)-approximation (where e is the base of the natural logarithm). Since
we can approximate the expected number of active nodes under the Seed Set Process arbitrarily closely by
simulating the activation process (see [14] for an in-depth discussion of the greedy algorithm), we obtain the
following corollary:
Corollary 14 The best starting set S for the Seed Set Process can be approximated within (1 − 1/e− ǫ) in
polynomial time, for any ǫ > 0.
3.3 Diminishing Returns of Expected Social Welfare
Finally, we use the machinery of coverage processes to show diminishing returns of social welfare. Consider
an arbitrary coverage process. When the coverage process starts with the set T , let φ(T ) be a random
variable describing the set of nodes active at the end of the process. Thus, the distribution of φ(T ) for all T
precisely characterizes the coverage process. Our main theorem is now the following:
Theorem 15 Let h(S) be any monotone submodular function of S. Then, E [h(φ(T ))] is a monotone sub-
modular function of T , where the expectation is taken over the randomness in φ(T ).
This theorem follows from the general result of [18], since all coverage processes are locally submodular, and
our utility function is submodular with respect to the set of sharing neighbors. However, below we give a
very simple proof based on reachability in graphs using the fact that φ is a coverage process. This is useful
for the purpose of simulating the process and estimating φ. It means that instead of generating random
thresholds and simulating a dynamic process, we can generate a random graph and then simply use BFS to
find the number of reachable nodes.
Proof. Because φ is a coverage process, by Theorem 8, there is a distribution Pr[·] over graphs H such
that for any set T , the set of nodes reachable in H from T has the same distribution as φ(T ). Let φH(T )
denote the set of nodes reachable from T in H . Then,
E [h(φ(T ))] =
∑
H
Pr[H ] · h(φH(T )).
Fix some graph H and let S ⊆ T and x /∈ T . Then,
h(φH(T + x))− h(φH(T )) = h(φH(T ) ∪ φH({x}))− h(φH(T ))
≤ h(φH(S) ∪ φH({x}))− h(φH(S))
= h(φH(S + x))− h(φH(S)),
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where the inequality followed from Inequality (1), and the equalities from the definitions of reachability in a
graph. Thus, for any fixed graph H , the function h(φH(T )) is monotone and submodular in T . Because the
Pr[H ] are probabilities, E [h(φ(T ))] is a non-negative linear combination of monotone submodular functions,
and thus also monotone and submodular.
The final piece of the proof of Theorem 3 is the following lemma, showing that monotonicity and sub-
modularity of the Seed Set Model imply diminishing returns for the original model.
Lemma 16 Let f be a non-negative, monotone, submodular function on sets. Consider the function g
defined as follows: Each element u is included in S independently with probability qu(πu), where qu is an
increasing and concave function of πu. Define g(π) = E [f(S)]. Then, g is monotone and satisfies the
diminishing returns property as defined in Definition 1.
Proof. First, notice that g(π) =
∑
S′⊆V f(S
′)
∏
u∈S′ qu(πu)
∏
u/∈S′(1 − qu(πu)). In order to show the
diminishing returns property, it is enough to show that ∂g(π)∂πi ≥ 0 and
∂g(π)
∂πi∂πj
≤ 0 for all i, j ∈ V . Using the
definition of g, we have:
∂g(π)
∂πi
=
∑
S⊆V,i∈S
f(S) ·
dqi(πi)
dπi
·
∏
u∈S,u6=i
qu(πu) ·
∏
u/∈S
(1 − qu(πu))
−
∑
S⊆V,i/∈S
f(S)
dqi(πi)
dπi
·
∏
u∈S
qu(πu) ·
∏
u/∈S,u6=i
(1 − qu(πu))
=
∑
S⊆V,i∈S
(f(S)− f(S − i)) ·
dqi(πi)
dπi
·
∏
u∈S,u6=i
qu(πu) ·
∏
u/∈S
(1− qu(πu))
≥ 0.
The last inequality holds because dqi(πi)dπi ≥ 0 and f is monotone.
Next we need to show that ∂g(π)∂πi∂πj ≤ 0 for all i, j ∈ V . For i = j, a calculation similar to the one above
shows that
∂2g(π)
∂π2i
=
∑
S⊆V,i∈S
(f(S)− f(S − i)) ·
d2qi(πi)
dπ2i
·
∏
u∈S,u6=i
qu(πu) ·
∏
u/∈S
(1− qu(πu)),
which is non-positive because f is monotone and qi is concave.
Finally, suppose that i 6= j. Using a calculation similar to the one above, we can rewrite ∂g(π)∂πi∂πj as
∑
S⊆V \{i,j}
(f(S + i+ j)− f(S + i)− f(S + j) + f(S)) ·
dqi(πi)
dπi
·
dqj(πj)
dπj
·
∏
u∈S
qu(πu) ·
∏
u/∈S,u6=i,j
(1− qu(πu)),
which is non-positive because f is submodular and qi, qj are concave.
With Theorem 13 and Lemma 16, we can now complete the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider one node u. The probability that it becomes active initially is
p0u = Prob[λuπu ≥ Cu] = 1−
Cu
πu
.
Recall that Cu = cu ·
∑
v dv, and πu ≥ Cu in our model, so this number is always non-negative.
Clearly, p0u is also a monotone increasing function of πu. To verify concavity, we simply take two deriva-
tives: the second derivative is −2Cu(πu)3 , and thus non-positive, so p
0
u is concave.
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Now, consider all the nodes u which did not initially become active. This is equivalent to saying that
λuπu ≤ Cu. But subject to this bound, λuπu is uniformly random, so we are in the situation of having an
initially active set S, and for each remaining node u, the payment is independently and uniformly random in
[0, Cu]. By Theorems 13 and 15, the expected social welfare W (S) is a monotone and submodular function
of the seed set S, so long as W is submodular in the set of active nodes. We can therefore apply Lemma 16
to E [h(φ(T ))], which implies that W (π1, . . . , πn) has the diminishing returns property.
Each of the social welfare functions listed in Section 2 can be shown to be monotone and submodular
in the set of active nodes by simple calculations. Thus, for all of these objective functions, the total social
welfare is a monotone function of the payments with diminishing returns properties.
4 Experimental evaluation
In this section, we summarize our observations based on simulations both on synthetic and real-world P2P
networks.
We have developed a simulator for the three models described in Section 2.
4.1 Simulation model
Given a payment scheme π, we generate random λu and compute the number of active (sharing) nodes. We
also compute the value of the social welfare according to the utility functions in Section 2.
In addition, we calculate the total payments, and the average payment per active and per serviced node.
These numbers are averaged over 1000 iterations, each with different random λ.
Network topology. For our evaluation, we consider different network topologies, including two network
topologies derived from real-world data sets [13, 20, 21], and a regular two-dimensional grid topology. The
real-world data sets are based on measured end-to-end latencies between pairs of servers deployed in the
Internet [13]. The MIT King data set [21] is symmetric and measures RTT between each pair among
1740 servers, while the Harvard King data set [20] provides asymmetric median latencies between each pair
among 1895 servers. In addition to networks derived from these two data sets, we also consider a regular
two-dimensional grid.
We derive the download percentage matrix P from the latencies by setting pv,u = max(0, 1 −
∆u→v
Γ ),
where ∆u→v is the latency from u to v, and Γ is a hard threshold for tolerable latencies. This models the fact
that users prefer to download from peers to which they have fast connections, and have a threshold beyond
which latency may not be tolerable any more. By varying Γ, we can obtain denser or sparser download
network topologies. We will refer to the networks derived from the MIT King data set as MIT networks,
and those derived from the Harvard King data set as Harvard networks.
In addition to networks derived from these two data sets, we also consider a regular two-dimensional
grid. We do not report all results for all topologies here. Unless stated otherwise, our observed trends apply
to all of these topologies.
Payment schemes and non-sharing peers. In our experiments, we consider different payment schemes
π, to study the impact of payments on the propagation of sharing behavior. We parameterize the schemes
with two parameters α, β, and set πu = α · dβu, where du is the degree of node u in the network defined by
the pu,v values. Thus, the financial utilities are chosen uniformly at random from the interval [0, α · dβu].
We also consider the impact of peers who cannot (or do not want to) share the file at all, regardless of the
payment offered. Such peers may still be interested in downloading the file. Their presence can be expected
to decrease the sharing behavior in networks, as they will place load on other peers without contributing.
We call such nodes “Empty” nodes, and consider the impact of different percentages of Empty nodes on the
overall sharing percentage.
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Figure 1: Comparison of different models, using the Harvard network with no Empty nodes.
4.2 Results
Comparison of different models. We begin by estimating the size of network effects, by comparing the
Demand model with the No-Network and One-Hop models. Figure 1 (a) compares the participation rates
under the three models, with the same payment scheme and same network (Harvard). We keep β = 1
constant in the payment scheme, and vary α. Thus, payments are proportional to nodes’ degrees. The figure
shows that by ignoring network effects, we would underestimate the number of sharing nodes by about 15%
on average, and as much as 25% (for α = 1.2). The same trends hold for the fraction of serviced nodes (not
shown here): the number of serviced nodes is underestimated by about 10% if ignoring network effects.
Figure 1 (b) compares the number of active nodes per unit of payment spent by the network administrator.
This is an interesting metric as it captures the tradeoff between participation and payments. Compared to
the number of active nodes, the choice of model seems to have remarkably little impact on the estimate of
this quantity. For small values of α, the network effects lead to slightly higher payments per active nodes,
as the network effects lead to an activation of more high-degree nodes, which have higher payments. This
effect disappears as α increases, and more nodes are activated in the No-Network model as well. The same
trends hold for the number of serviced nodes per unit of payment spent (not shown here).
The results reported here stay essentially the same both for the MIT and grid topologies. In particular,
the underestimate of the number of active nodes by the No-Network model is essentially the same in these
topologies. In the grid topology, the No-Network model in fact overestimates the cost per active node by
about 10%, as the dependence on the degree disappears, and network effects lead to an activation of more
nodes with smaller payments.
Different Social Welfare Functions We evaluate our theoretical results against the number of serviced
nodes and the two social welfare functions sum-welfare and max-welfare, as defined in Section 2. All three
are plotted in Figure 2. Although each social welfare function differs from the others in terms of the degree
of submodularity (for example, sum-welfare can be shown to be completely modular in the number of active
nodes), the curvatures of the plots as a function of payments are more or less the same. Thus, the concavity
(diminishing returns) appears to be dominated by the submodularity of the activation process.
Different payment schemes. For a network administrator, it is particularly interesting how the choice
of payments will affect sharing behavior, and the cost-effectiveness of achieving a certain participation rate.
Our next set of experiments therefore shows the percentage of active nodes, and the number of active nodes
per unit of payment, when the parameters α and β in the payments πu = α · dβu are varied.
Figure 3 (a) shows the percentage of active nodes in Harvard network with 50% Empty nodes, as a
14
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
α
So
cia
l W
el
fa
re
 
 
# Serviced Nodes
Sum Utility
Max Utility
Figure 2: Sum-Welfare, Max-Welfare and the number of serviced nodes, Harvard network.
function of α and β. Figure 3 (b) shows the number of active nodes per unit of payment under the same
setting. The cost effectiveness is maximized for very small values of α and β, specifically β = 0 and α = 1.2.
However, this comes at a steep price, in that almost no nodes (only about 4.4% of the network) share in this
case.
Clearly, there is no single point at which the network should operate. Rather, a network administrator
who wants to achieve a certain participation rate can use these plots find the most cost-effective payment
scheme to achieve this rate. For instance, if the goal is to achieve 30% sharing, this can be achieved by
setting α = 1.6 and β = 1.5, or α = 1.8 and β = 1. Of these, the first scheme spends about 30 units per
active node, while the second scheme spends about 7 units per active node. Thus, a judicious choice of
payments can lead to significant savings while ensuring the same level of participation.
In general, the plot suggests that β ∈ [0.5, 1] tends to lead to good tradeoffs between participation and
cost: for smaller values of β, participation tends to be too low, while for higher values, the cost per active
node increases significantly.
The observed trends are fairly independent of the network topologies. In particular, the plots for both
the grid and MIT network also suggest that β ∈ [0.5, 1] gives the best cost efficiency for a given fraction of
participating nodes.
Different thresholds (Γ). Finally, we investigate the impact of different latency tolerance thresholds Γ on
the activation process. Recall that the larger Γ, the more peers u may serve v. For instance, with Γ = 2ms,
the average degree of nodes in the Harvard network is 4.58, while with Γ = 5ms, the average degree increases
to 14.93. In the resulting denser graph, we would expect less degree imbalance, and overall higher network
effects; however, the payments will need to compensate for more downloads from any individual node.
The experiments, conducted on the Harvard network with no Empty nodes, confirm this intuition. When
β = 0, Figure 4 (a) shows that the number of nodes serviced is smaller in HarvardΓ=5ms than in HarvardΓ=2ms.
The reason is that the payments do not increase with the degree, so it is costlier for nodes in HarvardΓ=5ms
to become active. As β increases, and high degrees result in higher compensation, more nodes are serviced
in HarvardΓ=5ms. With β > 0, payments increase in the node degree, and nodes in HarvardΓ=5ms receive
more payments because of their higher average degree. Thus, more nodes are activated, and as a result,
more nodes can be serviced.
The increased activation comes at a price, as seen in Figure 4 (b). The higher average degree in
HarvardΓ=5ms, combined with the dependence of payments on the degrees, leads to somewhat higher pay-
ments per active (or serviced) node. Thus, in the Demand model, the increased participation in denser
networks is not only a result of network effects, but also of higher payments.
Therefore, in order to investigate the effectiveness of density itself on the participation or service rate, we
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Figure 3: Comparison of different payment schemes, Harvard network with 50% Empty nodes. Notice that
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Figure 4: Comparison of different thresholds, Harvard network with no Empty nodes.
make the following comparison. Fix the payment per active node for both HarvardΓ=5ms and HarvardΓ=2ms
to an arbitrary number by choosing the appropriate payment schemes for each graph. For example, in order
to get a payment of 23 per active node, a payment scheme for HarvardΓ=5ms would be α = 2.7 and β = 1
and for HarvardΓ=2ms would be α = 1 and β = 1.5. It turns out that the denser network (HarvardΓ=5ms)
gives a significantly higher rate for both participation and service. For a payment of 23 units per active
node, for instance, the fraction of participating nodes for HarvardΓ=5ms is 86% while the same fraction goes
down to 39% in HarvardΓ=2ms.
Based on the simulations, the following were our main observations:
1. How different are the predictions in sharing behavior between the Demand , the No-Network , and the
16
One-Hop models? Our results show a significant difference between the models in their prediction of
sharing: while the fraction of sharing nodes is qualitatively similar, the predictions ignoring network
effects can be off by about 15%–25%. This results in up to 10% depreciation in the number of serviced
peers.
2. How does the participation depend on the network topology and density? We observe that the denser
the network, the higher the rate of participation, given fixed incentives. This holds across grid and
realistic Internet topologies.
3. How does the payment scheme affect the number of sharing and serviced nodes, and the price paid per
node? Our experiments suggest that the payments πu for realistic topologies should be proportional to
u’s degree to give high overall participation at low cost. In other words, given a network topology, there
exists a choice of parameters for payments proportional to node degrees that maximizes the overall
“bang per buck”. We derive these parameters for each network topology experimentally.
5 Conclusions
There are several natural directions for future work. A very interesting question arises when taking payments
by “reputation” or download priorities into account. While monetary payments can (in principle) be increased
arbitrarily, reputation is inherently constant-sum: if some peers are recognized as outstanding sharers, then
others will receive less recognition, and might find the reduced recognition not enough incentive to keep
sharing. Similarly, download priorities come at the expense of other peers, and can thus not be arbitrarily
increased for all members of the network. As a result, the process of sharing will not necessarily be monotone:
peers may choose to stop sharing once too many other peers are active. A first question is then whether
stable (equilibrium) states even exist. If so, it would be interesting what fraction of the peers will be sharing,
what the social welfare is, and how these quantities will depend on the network structure.
From a more practical viewpoint, it would be desirable to evaluate how accurately our model (or a
variation thereof) captures the actual behavior of participants in a P2P system. This would likely be a
difficult experiment to perform, as many of the parameters, such as file demands and latency, are inherently
transient, and in a realistic system, payments cannot be changed constantly to evaluate the impact of such
changes.
In the bigger picture, the network designer also has to be concerned about manipulation by peers. For
instance, colluding peers could artificially inflate the perceived “degree” of a peer (by claiming a download
preference), and thus the payments to that peer. A more thorough investigation of mechanisms taking these
and other concerns into account is an exciting direction for future work.
Finally, our work lies among various applications in economics for which there are positive or negative
externalities among agents in a neighborhood. Our results suggest that in order to study different economic
metrics such as revenue or social welfare, we should always consider the cascading effect of agents’ strategies
over the network.
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A Hardness of Approximation under the Seed Set Model
Here, we prove that finding a seed set S to (even approximately) maximize the eventual number of active
nodes is hard under the Sharing Process. Let Best Seed be the optimization problem of finding the seed
set S of at most k nodes that maximizes the total number of sharing nodes, given n servers u1, . . . , un and
the corresponding parameters cu, du, λu, λuπu, pv,u. (Notice that when all of the λu are given, the process is
deterministic.)
Proposition 17 It is hard to approximate Best Seed within n1−ǫ for any ǫ > 0 unless P = NP.
Proof. We reduce from the Vertex Cover problem. Recall that the Vertex Cover problem is for-
mulated as follows: Given a graph G = (V,E), a vertex cover is a set S ⊆ V of nodes such that each edge
e ∈ E has at least one endpoint in S. In the Vertex Cover decision problem, the input is a pair (G, k):
the question is whether there is a vertex cover of size at most k. We assume without loss of generality that
G contains no isolated vertices.
Given an arbitrary Vertex Cover instance with N = |V | nodes and M = |E| ≥ N/2 edges, we
construct an instance of Best Seed as follows: For each node u ∈ V , we have a node wu. For each edge
e ∈ E, we create two nodes xe, x′e. Finally, setting r = 1/ǫ, we create M
r “bulk” nodes y1, . . . , yMr . We set
px′e,yi = 1 for all yi, xe. For all e, px′e,xe = 1. Finally, whenever e is incident on u, we have pxe,wu = 1. All
other values of p are 0.
We visualize the construction above in 4 layers. The “node layer” consists of all nodes wu for all u. The
“primary layer” consists of all xe. The “secondary layer” consists of all x
′
e. Finally, the “bulk layer” consists
of all yi. Next, we define payments and demands:
λvπv =


0 if v = wu for some u ∈ V (node layer)
3.5 if v = xe for some e ∈ E (primary layer)
0 if v = x′e for some e ∈ E (secondary layer)
M + 0.5 otherwise (bulk layer)
dv =


0 if v = wu for some u ∈ V (node layer)
2 if v = xe for some e ∈ E (primary layer)
2 if v = x′e for some e ∈ E (secondary layer)
0 otherwise (bulk layer)
First, let T be a vertex cover of size at most k. Consider the effect of starting with the nodes wu, u ∈ T
as a seed set. Because T is a vertex cover, each primary node xe now has an active node wu with pxe,wu = 1,
so that its demand of 2 is split between itself and (at least) one node wu. Thus, upon activation, it would
face at most a demand of 2 from x′e and 1 from itself, whereas its payment is 3.5. Hence, each primary node
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will become active in the second round. Once the primary node xe is active, x
′
e will split its demand evenly
between xe and all active bulk nodes. Hence, each bulk node yi will see demand at most 1 from each x
′
e, for
a total of M . Since its payment offer is larger, yi will become active. Hence, all bulk nodes will be active by
round 3, and the total number of active nodes is at least M r +M + k.
Conversely, suppose that strictly more than M + N nodes are active. Because none of the secondary
nodes ever become active (since they have a payment offer of 0), this means that at least one bulk node
must be active. Let yi be the first bulk node to become active, breaking ties arbitrarily. Because no other
bulk nodes are active at this time, yi must see demand at least 1 from each secondary node x
′
e. And because
its payment offer is only M + 0.5, this means that it cannot see demand 2 from any secondary node —
otherwise, the total demand would exceed the payment. This means that for each secondary node x′e, the
corresponding primary node xe must already be active. Without loss of generality, the seed set contained no
primary nodes — otherwise, the node xe could be replaced by wu (where u is an endpoint of e), which would
next activate xe. Thus, xe must have become activated at some point of the process, which can only happen
when its total demand is smaller than its payment. Since at that point, only xe can serve the demand of
x′e, this in turn means that xe’s own demand must be split between itself and one or more active nodes wu.
Thus, if S is the set of initially active nodes in the node layer, then the corresponding vertices of G must
form a vertex cover.
In summary, if there is a vertex cover of size at most k, then there is a seed set of size at most k
activating at least M r +M + k nodes, whereas otherwise, no seed set of size at most k can activate more
than M +N ≤ 3M nodes. Thus, no approximation better than Ω(M r−1) is possible. Since the total number
of nodes is n = M r + 2M + N ≤ 2M r (for r large enough), this proves an approximation hardness of
Ω(n1−1/r) = Ω(n1−ǫ), unless P=NP.
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